"War is like a repair job that never ends: it just gets stopped. Usually, it is very easy to start a war, but extremely difficult to finish it. The Soviet Union, when it entered Afghanistan with a limited contingent, planned to stay there for six months, and it all turned into ten years. The same situation occurred with the US in Vietnam and much later in Afghanistan," writes analyst Alexey Krol, who lives in the US and previously lived in Moscow.
"The reason for this is that, although the war is not going as planned, it is impossible for the political elite to announce: 'You know, oops, we have failed in everything.' They need to achieve some kind of victory, primarily for media effect," Krol writes.
"I read the news every day, at least about what is happening there, and various thoughts arise:
- Regarding regime change. If you remember, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin developed this long ago and introduced the concept of a revolutionary situation. Any regime change can only occur if there is already an established revolutionary situation. To put it simply, 'the top does not want, the bottom cannot live as before.' Only then can any trigger lead to a regime change.
As far as I understand, there was no revolutionary situation in Iran because the top was satisfied, and the proportion of people from the bottom who could not live as before was too low. That is, apparently, the majority of people have somehow gotten used to it. This is roughly the same as what is happening in Russia. When Russia started the war in Ukraine, everyone thought that the Russian people would rise up quickly, which did not happen. The reason is that there was no revolutionary situation in Russia. Everything was fine at the top, and relatively everything was fine at the bottom. Therefore, there were no prerequisites.
Accordingly, while what we are observing is that despite the fact that Iran's military potential has been weakened to a certain extent, there are no prerequisites for regime change.
Something similar happened when the Soviet Union sent troops to Afghanistan. Because intelligence always significantly distorts the situation and tries to present everything in a way that is beneficial to intelligence, rather than as it really is.
- The situation with the use of weapons is very interesting, as what is happening in the war between Ukraine and Russia shows that the old approach to air defense does not work.
Iran is sending a huge number of cheap drones that quickly deplete the stocks of expensive missiles, which is a kind of shock to the entire air defense doctrine that was formed about 50 years ago.
This is a good wake-up call for the Pentagon, which will force them to think hard and scramble because they were sitting comfortably, everything was fine, and suddenly it became clear that this entire military machine is quite ineffective.
- The situation with the Gulf countries is very interesting, as they are furious. Moreover, I suspect that they are furious not only with Iran but also with the US.
Because, in fact, all their wealth, based on oil and to some extent on tourism, is now under threat, which in some sense may even be beneficial to the United States. The United States could potentially become a serious oil exporter and occupy this niche. But this is, of course, conspiracy theory. Nevertheless, the situation is not very pleasant.
- It also seems to me that this will prompt very serious shifts in logistics because a huge number of countries, as it turns out, depend on these oil supplies from the Gulf. This is almost 20–25% of the world's total oil supply. Accordingly, many countries are at risk of industrial shutdowns and power outages. They urgently need to change their oil supply logistics and look for where to get liquefied gas or oil.
At the same time, there is 100% uncertainty regarding when the Strait of Hormuz will be unblocked. That is, everyone understands that they cannot wait. They need to take some measures now to find alternative ways to obtain the necessary amount of oil and liquefied gas so that their industry does not stop and there is light in homes. This concerns a huge number of countries, including developed ones like Japan and South Korea.
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Interestingly, China has shown foresight. It seems to me that they suspected something. And they made huge oil reserves over the past year: oil storage facilities, tankers, plus their investments in alternative energy are paying off in this sense because they mitigate the blow that everyone received from the cessation of supplies.
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It is generally very interesting to observe how this situation polarizes countries regarding what is happening. It will be interesting to see what happens next. The strategic question is when this war will end, and most importantly, in what form this conclusion will be. It seems clear that Trump is trying to pressure Iran to bring them to a state of capitulation. Capitulation implies that they must accept all conditions. But this very much resembles the conditions of the Versailles Treaty with Kaiser Germany after World War I, which ultimately led to the rise of Hitler.
Well, in this case, the situation is the opposite because no one intends to humiliate the Persian people; on the contrary, everyone makes a clear distinction between the theological elites that brought the situation to this state and ordinary people.
That is, there is sympathy for Iran as a country, but no sympathy for the Iranian elite. As, in fact, is the same in Russia. There is a big difference between the Russian elite that brought the situation to its current state and just ordinary people living in Russia.
In Summary: The War in Iran and Geostrategy
1. War is easy to start, hard to finish
The political impossibility of admitting a mistake turns any conflict into a protracted one. The US has no clear 'exit strategy' regarding Iran.
2. There will be no regime change
There is no revolutionary situation in Iran: the elites are consolidated by the external threat, and the masses are adapted. Bombings do not create it.
3. Drones have broken the old air defense doctrine
Cheap UAVs burn expensive missiles — a systemic crisis of the missile defense architecture formed 50 years ago. The Pentagon is forced to restructure.
4. Gulf countries are furious at everyone
Their wealth is under threat. Discontent is directed both at Iran and the US. Washington's potential benefit from the energy shock is structural but not a direct intent.
5. Hormuz: logistics will be rebuilt, but it will take 1–2 years
~20% of the world's oil and a fifth of LNG are at risk. No country can wait for unblocking — everyone is urgently looking for alternatives. Japan, Korea, and Europe will have a hard time.
6. China prepared in advance
Giant strategic reserves (~110 days of imports), investments in renewable energy — unexpectedly worked as insurance against geopolitical shock.
7. The US is intercepting the role of 'world insurer'
British P&I clubs refused coverage for Hormuz. The US entered through DFC with a reinsurance pool of $20 billion. The combo of 'military escort + state insurance' is a new tool of hegemony.
8. Iran's military potential is finite
Launchers are being systematically destroyed. In 2–4 weeks, exponential reduction of capabilities. The nuclear program is de facto frozen due to the destruction of infrastructure and lack of resources.
9. The disintegration of Iran is unlikely, except for the Kurdish issue
There are no structural forces for disintegration. The only real scenario is an attempt at Kurdish separation, which could trigger a chain reaction in Iraq and Turkey.
10. China and Russia will not intervene
China has a negotiation mentality; trade turnover with the US is incomparably more important than Iran. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, with no resources.
11. The US is fighting for Russia, not against it
Trump's logic: to end Ukraine 'somehow', gradually withdrawing Russia from sanctions isolation, not giving it to China. Russia is a future buffer in the main game of the US–China.
12. The war solidifies unipolarity
None of the centers of power were able to prevent or limit the actions of the US and Israel. The idea of multipolarity is de facto buried in energy and finance," the expert believes.
