Morally Resilient - What Latvia is Betting on in the Fight Against Russia's Information Operations 0 7

The study notes that Latvia has long been a target of Russian information influence operations due to both its geographical location and the significant share of the Russian-speaking population. Threats to Latvia's information space were first identified in the national defense concept for 2012-2016 and were also included in subsequent revisions.

The current national defense concept for 2023-2027 is based on the concept of comprehensive defense, which includes individual resilience, collective resilience at the level of communities, businesses, and municipalities, as well as the resilience of the state as a whole. The document emphasizes the need to strengthen the government's and society's ability to resist manipulation, including disinformation and information influence operations, and to raise public awareness of threats to the interests of the state and the intentions of potential aggressors.

The document complements the national concept of strategic communication and information space security for 2023-2027, which provides for strengthening three basic elements of the information space - strategic communication, media environment, and media and information literacy.

As highlighted in the study, Latvia has developed an interagency approach to monitoring, identifying, analyzing, and responding to hostile information. The coordinating role in this process is played by the Department of Strategic Communication and Coordination of the State Chancellery, which regularly holds meetings with representatives of various institutions on information security issues.

The State Chancellery leads the coordination of strategic communication and information security, develops concepts, conducts information campaigns, and organizes training on strengthening societal resilience. In turn, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborates with international partners and participates in public diplomacy events. The Ministry of Defense conducts resilience-strengthening activities such as lectures and training, as well as provides funding to non-governmental organizations. Meanwhile, the National Armed Forces conduct threat analysis and participate in educational activities, while the Security Police carry out threat analysis, investigations, and preventive consultations. The National Council for Electronic Media restricts information sources that pose a danger to state security and implements media literacy programs.

The study notes that after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Latvia has intensified measures to strengthen societal resilience and readiness. Starting in 2024, mandatory training in national defense has been introduced into the secondary education program, and the Ministry of Defense conducts lectures on crisis response for younger school students. Additionally, Latvia has implemented an education reform that provides for teaching in the Latvian language in all schools.

As indicated by the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence, Latvia has improved its legal regulation in recent years by amending the Electronic Communications Law, the Electronic Media Law, and the Criminal Code. The amendments provide broader opportunities to restrict information sources from Russia or related to the Kremlin, as well as stricter penalties for assisting a foreign state in carrying out actions against Latvia, for justifying war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. For national security reasons, access to more than 400 websites has been restricted to date.

The study emphasizes that Latvia's approach to limiting information influence operations is characterized by a resilience-oriented "whole-of-society" defense model, flexible interagency cooperation led by the State Chancellery, and a wide range of legal tools.