Japan Expands Economic Expansion in Africa 0 18

Japan is quietly making a significant bet on Africa. It aims to lead a "rules-based" infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region without requiring African governments to choose between China and the West. Tokyo's emerging strategy is based on a paradoxical combination – leadership through standards plus practical compromises. Against the backdrop of the "America First 2.0" program and India's cautious policy, Japan positions itself as a source of debt-sensitive, compatibility-oriented infrastructure in Africa. However, the high concentration of Chinese projects on the continent will push it towards reluctant cooperation with China-related assets.

It is unlikely that African governments will dismiss Japan's offer as a hedging option. In the era of "America First 2.0," Tokyo, perhaps learning from the experience of Trump's first presidency, is ready to assert its leadership in the Indo-Pacific region rather than wait for Washington to set the pace. However, the changes that facilitate Japan's leadership also require flexibility from Japan itself. Alliances are shifting, New Delhi is balancing between Washington and Beijing, and Japan will likely end up partially and reluctantly cooperating with China-related projects – not because it welcomes Beijing's presence, but because China's soft and hard infrastructure is too deeply rooted in Africa to be ignored, especially given the central role of the private sector in Japan's approach to engagement with Africa.

Tokyo does not appear unprepared. Japan has been building a conceptual framework for nearly two decades, starting with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's statement in 2007 about the strategic geography of the Indo-Pacific region in the Indian Parliament and culminating in the official inclusion of Africa in the concept of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" at the VI TICAD conference in Nairobi in 2016. At this meeting, it was promised to allocate about $30 billion for quality infrastructure, sustainable healthcare, and stability, while principles of debt sustainability and standards were established as hallmarks of Japan's strategy in Africa, countering the approach of China's Belt and Road Initiative. The evolution of TICAD – collaborative engagement with major multilateral organizations and G7/G20 initiatives, long-term capacity building, and mobilization of private capital – was evident even before the information noise began this year.

The distinction of TICAD 9 lies in the architecture of implementation. Instead of the loud headlines about megaprojects that characterized previous conferences, TICAD 9's hallmark is the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA) program in collaboration with the African Development Bank – up to $5.5 billion (2026–2028) combined with a stronger emphasis on concessional terms and risk insurance. This shifts the focus from "how much" to "on what terms," aligning with the issue of debt sustainability, which was less significant in previous cycles.

TICAD has always valued "quality infrastructure," but TICAD 9 demonstrated how Japan intends to finance it affordably. In the corridors, Kenya raised up to 25 billion yen through Samurai bonds issued with the support of Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) to reduce borrowing costs and combat losses in power grids – a vivid example of reducing financing risks in yen.

A few weeks earlier, Côte d'Ivoire became the first sovereign state south of the Sahara to issue Samurai bonds worth 50 billion yen with ESG labeling and a guarantee from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), expanding Africa's access to the Japanese investment base. Previous TICAD conferences rarely led to such notable breakthroughs, but for TICAD 9, these breakthroughs became an important tool.

Against the backdrop of a restructuring world, the logic of moving towards Africa is clear. China's expanding influence in Africa is becoming increasingly evident. It relies on the activities of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road Initiative. Just recently, in 2025, China announced the removal of all tariffs on exports from 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations. This offer reduces the complexities of selling goods in a vast market that no other partner can currently match on a comparable scale. It may also undermine the influence of tariff threats from the U.S. However, debt restructuring and risk control have also become more relevant than they were ten years ago.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration shifted to a "trade, not aid" strategy, evaluating the work of U.S. ambassadors in closing deals, promoting corridors supported by the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), such as Lobito, and reviewing the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) ahead of its expiration in 2025. These signals create uncertainty for exporters. Russia is strengthening its position in security while promoting nuclear megaprojects. In this environment, the multilateral TICAD approach, sensitive to debt, stands out as an alternative that many governments would like to include in their portfolios.

Paradoxically, the principle of "America First" creates space for Japan's leadership. If Washington's priorities narrow down to closing deals, extracting resources, and tariff reciprocity, someone else must emphasize Africa's belonging to a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," standards, compatibility, and debt sustainability. Japan presented this in Yokohama – a platform for collaborative creation, still supported by the UN and the African Union, which incorporates African priorities into Indo-Pacific supply chains without imposing a binary choice.

In essence, Tokyo could become a magnet for so-called rules-based connectivity in Africa, while the U.S. may focus on individual, less risky projects.

However, leadership does not mean the absence of competitors, and here China's deep influence in Africa matters. From 2000 to 2023, Chinese creditors provided 49 African governments and seven regional borrowers with loans totaling about $182.3 billion across 1,306 loans, alongside establishing industrial parks, digital cooperation, and tools such as the "Nine Programs" launched since 2021. They cover a wide range of areas: healthcare, poverty alleviation, people-to-people exchanges, innovation, green development, digitalization, and security. The introduction of zero tariffs in 2025 further shifts trade incentives in favor of China. African politicians will not abandon existing Chinese projects in favor of aligning with a new strategy; they will seek specific benefits from different partners – cheaper financing here, better standards or more predictable operation and maintenance there. This reality pushes Japan towards selective, rules-oriented cooperation with China-related assets rather than a complete exclusion of Beijing.

India's restructuring also amplifies this nuance. India, due to its geographical position and regional dominance in South Asia, is an integral part of any framework strategy in the Indo-Pacific region and may be particularly important for Japan's broader framework strategy regarding the Indian Ocean and Africa. However, after Trump's threat to impose punitive tariffs, New Delhi's diplomacy has become more mercantile and cautious. There are noted balancing acts between BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization led by China and Russia with steps to develop supply chains within the Quad and purchasing Russian energy at reduced prices while simultaneously deepening ties with the West in technology. In the case of Africa, India, taking a wait-and-see approach, is less likely to support a program of complete disengagement from China on the continent. For Japan, whose narrative of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" originated in Abe's speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007, all this signifies a trend towards engagement with India, at least in the context of practical coalition-building in the Indo-Pacific and considering the new U.S. approach to its allies and partners.

What might "cautious, partial cooperation" look like in practice? Let’s start with corridors and maintenance. Japan's comparative advantage lies in multilateral standards, safety and operation, maintenance. In African ports, power grids, and roads where Chinese firms are undertaking construction, Japanese participants can contribute to modernization, safety systems, and maintenance regimes funded through JBIC/NEXI risk-sharing mechanisms and channels related to the African Development Bank (AfDB).

In the digital sphere, Tokyo's ambition to develop skills in AI and dialogue on data governance can leverage existing networks to enhance productivity without the need for complete equipment replacement. None of this requires endorsing every Chinese practice. It’s only about compatibility.

Overall, Africa will not turn down new cooperation options, and Japan is ready to provide them. Against the backdrop of the "America First" strategy, Tokyo will likely claim Indo-Pacific leadership in Africa on issues of rules, skills, and risk-sharing. But precisely because relationships between countries have not been established, and India is taking a wait-and-see approach, the most reliable path lies through pragmatic coexistence with Chinese assets: cooperation where standards and sustainability can be improved, competition where necessary, and an unwavering positioning of Africa as a co-creator rather than a bystander. This is not a compromise for the sake of compromise, but a strategy for a competitive century.