The changed perception of threat has forced the Kremlin to develop a new concept for the Baltic Sea region that would allow for the analysis of the associated challenges and offer the Moscow elite opportunities for influence over it. This is reported by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service in its latest annual report.
As noted by the department, the Kremlin has decided to re-establish itself in the Baltic Sea region, or as it is now referred to in Moscow, the Baltic-Scandinavian macroregion, using academic tools.
The concept of the Baltic-Scandinavian macroregion (BSM), or the so-called Greater Baltic, has been increasingly used in the corridors of power in the Kremlin since the onset of the full-scale war in Ukraine. One of the incentives was the changed perception of threat: the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO represented a significant shift in the security landscape of the Baltic Sea region for Russia.
Another reason was the weakening of Russia's strategic positions in the Baltic Sea: for example, the country lost access to key formats of regional cooperation, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States or the Council of Ministers of the Nordic Countries. The new circumstances forced the Kremlin to develop a new concept for the Baltic Sea region that would allow for the analysis of the associated challenges and offer the Moscow elite opportunities for influence.
Thus, the promotion of the BSM concept has been taken up by the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation for Cross-Border Cooperation (UPS AP), which has been organizing and planning Kremlin policy in the Baltic States and Belarus since 2021. With the emergence of the BSM concept in 2023, this list also included Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Poland.
As is typical of the Kremlin, the UPS also includes individuals with experience in intelligence services, so methods characteristic of intelligence agencies are used to achieve its goals, such as an extensive network of front organizations, which includes seemingly independent Russian research institutions.
In 2022, the Cross-Border Cooperation Administration tasked Russian scientific institutions with creating research centers specializing in the Baltic-Scandinavian macroregion that would provide the administration with necessary analytical materials. This was not the only directive: Russian scientists were instructed to use their connections among scholars in the Baltic Sea countries to restore contacts with representatives of the political circles in the region.
The influence of the Presidential Administration in the BSM network is very significant: both the topics of research laboratories and the personnel involved in the projects are coordinated with it. Analytical materials and reports from BSM scientists about contacts with the scientific community of the Baltic Sea countries primarily end up on the desks of curators from the Presidential Administration and intelligence services.
The above clearly shows that scientific work and academic communication within the BSM do not fall under the concept of academic freedom: it is merely a facade behind which the Russian state apparatus is purposefully advancing its political ambitions, the department states.
One of the fruits of the BSM concept is the international discussion format "Baltic Platform," under the guise of scientific cooperation within which the Kremlin attempts to revive relations with scholars, politicians, and local authorities both in the Baltic States and in the Nordic countries. The logic of the initiative is as follows: first, a dialogue begins between scientists on non-political issues, such as environmental problems in the Baltic Sea, and then there is a gradual transition to relevant political topics, such as security architecture in the region and Europe, as well as anti-Russian sanctions policy.
However, the Kremlin's efforts in the case of the "Baltic Platform" have failed: over more than two years of its existence, it has not been possible to establish an active exchange of opinions between the scientific communities of Russia and the Baltic Sea countries. Therefore, Russian scientists, who are in a pariah status, primarily communicate among themselves on the "Baltic Platform." But to give the format at least a hint of internationality, scholars from Russia's vassal state - Belarus, as well as "experts" on the Greater Baltic from China, India, and other countries have been involved.
By giving "scientific cooperation" an international character, Russia is trying to hide the fact that there is virtually no influx of new experts in the country who deeply understand the countries, languages, societies, and cultures of the Baltic Sea region.
All Russian initiatives in the field of international scientific cooperation are part of an influence apparatus integrated with the Kremlin and intelligence services. They have nothing to do with traditional academic research work and freedom. The same, of course, applies to the "scientific cooperation" initiatives within the Baltic-Scandinavian macroregion: they in no way reflect Russia's sincere interest in the ecological well-being of the region. Instead, the Kremlin is seeking opportunities to politically re-establish itself in the region through this concept. The loyal scientific community may consciously attempt to intimidate the Baltic Sea countries with scenarios of ecological disasters - all to make the states of the region realize the inevitable necessity of communicating and cooperating with Russia to avoid worse outcomes.
Western experts invited to the BSM conference or video meeting should consider that Russian scientists primarily use the information obtained from them for hostile purposes, namely to identify vulnerabilities of the Baltic Sea countries and their allies. Participation in such events will inevitably mean contributing to analytical reports for Kremlin officials, which often contain political recommendations aimed at harming the interests of both the Baltic Sea region and the coastal NATO and EU member states.
For example, scientists in the BSM network recommended to Russia: to interfere in the internal politics of the Baltic and Scandinavian countries; to undermine their foreign, defense, economic, and energy policies; to accuse these countries of violating the rights of Russian-speaking and indigenous populations; to accuse them of persecuting the Russian Orthodox Church and of falsifying history.
The best way to counter such activities is to completely avoid cooperation with Russian and Belarusian universities, scientific institutions, and expert networks. However, paradoxically, the most effective antidote against its own poison has been invented by the eastern neighbor itself: by waging war against Ukraine, Russia has isolated itself and lost most of its contacts in the western direction. Therefore, the "research vessel BSM," which has found itself in the quiet backwater of NATO's internal sea, is already rusting and leaking.
